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ABSTRACT

Many of the nations of Africa have struggled with violence
since their independencefrom colonialpowers. The formation of
an intercontinental body, the Organization for African Unity,
did little to reduce the number or severity of the conflicts. The
failure of this organization to maintain peace was due in large
part to normative boundaries that prevented its involvement in
the internal conflicts of its member nations. The Organization
of African Unity was dissolved in favor of a new organization,
the African Union, in 2001. The mandate of the African Union
is much more proactive than that of its predecessor with regard
to intervention in internal conflicts. Additionally, some of
structural and practical weaknesses of the Organization of
African Unity have been addressed in the African Union. The
conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan proved to be the first real
test case for the efficacy of the African Union. It is already
apparent from the African Union's performance in Darfur that
some of the normative weaknesses of the Organizationof African
Unity have been overcome. Yet, the African Union must do
more, both in Darfur and elsewhere, to show that it is not
hampered by the weaknesses of its predecessor.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

THE ORGANIZATION FOR AFRICAN UNITY .....................

545

Background .........................................................
OA U Intervention in Africa ................................
Was the OAU Effective at African Conflict
M aintenance?........................ . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . .. . . . .. .

545
549

A.
B.
C.

552

544

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39:543

D.

II.

III.
IV .

Normative, Structural, and Practical
Limitations of the OA U ......................................
THE AFRICAN UNION .....................................................
A.
The Formation of a New African
Intercontinental Organization...........................
B.
Differences between the A U Charterand
the OA U Charter.................................................
C.
Will the A U Be More Effective at African
Conflict Maintenance than the OAU? ................
D.
The A U and Peacekeeping: Darfur as a
L itm us Test .........................................................
WILL THE PROMISE OF THE AU BEAR FRUIT? .... . .. . . . .. . . .
CONCLUSION ..................................................................

555
559
559
576
576
576
576
576

Africa. The name conjures up images of a faraway place of
unfamiliar landscapes and alien cultures for most. The absence of
direct experience readily allows popular images to fill the void. Africa
becomes guns, warmongering, and endless death and destruction, all
presented in bite-sized pieces on the front page of newspapers. The
shock of the reported brutality, coupled with sentiments of its
inevitability on a continent destined for endless strife, leads most to
conclude that Africa is a lost cause. The complexity of the African
situation, and the lengths to which some have gone to avoid and
address deadly conflict within it, is lost as well. The first hurdle to
understanding the true nature of conflict in Africa is the deceptive
portrait that has been painted of it in much of the rest of the world.
To be sure, many independent African nations have been beset
by conflict since their inception in the latter part of the twentieth
century. Early in their history, however, these countries banded
together to form the Organization of African Unity (OAU), an
intercontinental organization designed to promote peace and
prosperity on the African continent. Given the recent history of
colonial domination, African countries were extremely reluctant to
cede any form of control over their internal affairs. As a result,
internal conflict, which would prove to be the most prevalent and
deadly form in Africa in the coming decades, was entirely outside of
the jurisdiction of the OAU. The result was that deadly conflict could
rage unhindered for decades on the continent, giving Africa its
reputation for ceaseless conflict.
The OAU was disbanded in favor of a new intercontinental
organization, the African Union (AU), in the first years of the twentyfirst century. Recognizing the urgent need to prevent and address
internal conflict within African nations, the AU was given legal
authority to intervene in certain forms of deadly internal conflict.
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The new mandate given to the AU represented a normative sea
change in African conflict prevention, management, and resolution.
Whether the promise of the new mandate would bring practical
change in addressing deadly conflict in Africa remained to be seen. A
test case for the AU was necessary. In 2003, the internal conflict in
the Darfur region of Sudan became that test case.
Part I of this paper discusses the OAU. Specifically, Part I.A.
addresses the formation of the organization and the underlying
principles that were adopted at its inception. Part. I.B. provides a
history of its interventions in African conflicts. Part. I.C. gives a
description of effective conflict maintenance, and examines the
conflict maintenance capabilities of the OAU. Part I.D. details the
normative, structural, and practical aspects of the OAU that limited
its effectiveness in conflict maintenance.
Part II discusses the newly-formed AU. Part II.A. gives an
account of how the AU came into existence, along with detailing its
underlying principles. Part II.B. analyzes the differences between
the Constitutive Act of the AU and the Charter of the OAU, and
compares and contrasts the normative and structural aspects of each.
Part II.C. examines whether the AU has the institutional capability
to be more effective at addressing conflict than was the OAU. Part
II.D. takes a look at the performance of the AU thus far in the context
of the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan.
Finally, Part III takes a step back to get a bird's-eye view of the
practical application of the Union's expanded powers, both in the
context of Darfur and elsewhere. This Part details the successes and
failures of the AU to date, and provides commentary on the direction
this organization must ultimately take to be successful.

I. THE ORGANIZATION FOR AFRICAN UNITY
A. Background
In 1963, and political turmoil was rampant on the African
continent.1 The struggle for independence from colonial rule was well
underway, 2 and the desire and demand for African independence and
self-determination began to manifest itself politically. 3 The ideal of

THE OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS 4-5 (Yassin El-Ayouty & I. William
1.
Zartman eds., 1984) [hereinafter TWENTY YEARS].
2.
Id.
3.
GINO J. NALDI, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS
ROLE 3-4 (1st ed. 1989) [hereinafter NALDI, AN ANALYSIS]; P. Mweti Munya, The
Organization of African Unity and its Role in Regional Conflict Resolution and Dispute
Settlement: A CriticalEvaluation, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 537, 540-43 (1999).
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Pan-African unity gave rise to different political groupings of free
African states, two of which predominated. 4 The Casablanca Group
was the more revolutionary of the two, advocating for the formation of
a "United States of Africa" under the power of a centralized
command. 5 The Monrovia Group, on the other hand, stressed the
importance of the independence, integrity, and sovereignty of each
6
African state, and advocated a loose association of those states.
The two groups came to together to agree on the formation of the
OAU. 7 The OAU Charter was signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on
May 25, 1963, at the closing of the Conference of the Heads of State
and Government.8 The OAU Charter "captured the radical-unionist
Pan-African spirit" of the Casablanca Group, while emphasizing the
independence and sovereignty of each individual state that was
advocated by the Monrovia Group. 9 The goals of the OAU were to
promote decolonization and independent self-government in African
states; to guarantee respect for territorial boundaries of the states;
and to promote social, political, and economic development on the
African continent.1 0
Article 2 of the OAU charter provides for purposes that reflect
some of the goals and aspirations of the Casablanca Group in terms of
African unity, along with some of those of the Monrovia group as well:
Article 2
1.

The Organization shall have the following purposes:
(a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
(b) To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to
achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
(c) To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and
independence;
(d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
(e)

2.

To promote international cooperation, having due regard to
the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.

To these ends, the Member States shall- coordinate and
harmonize their general policies, especially in the following
fields:

4.

NALDI: AN ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 4.

5.

Id.

6.
Id.; AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON CONSTITUTIVE, CONFLICT AND
SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN, AND JUDICIAL ISSUES 51 (Jeremy I. Levitt ed., 2003)
[hereinafter SELECTED DOCUMENTS].
7.
NALDI, AN ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 4.

8.
Id. at 3; SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 6, at 51.
9.
Id.
10.
SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 6, at 51.
12.
See Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, 479
U.N.T.S. 39, reprinted in SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 6, at 53 [hereinafter OAU
Charter].
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(a)

Political and diplomatic cooperation;

(b)

Economic
cooperation,
communications;

(c)

Educational and cultural cooperation;

(d)

Health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation;

(e)

Scientific and technical cooperation; and

(f)

Cooperation for defense and security.

including

transport

and

12

Further, the principles announced in Article 3 of the OAU Charter
indicate a codification of the principles of sovereign and territorial
integrity of the individual African states that were parties to the
Charter:
Article 3
The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article [2]
solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles:
1.
The sovereign equality of all Member States.
2.

Non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

3.

Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State
and for its inalienable right to independent existence.

4.

Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation,
conciliation, or arbitration.

5.

Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political
assassination as well as subversive activities on the part of
neighboring States or any other States.
Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African
territories which are still dependent.
Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all
14
blocs.

6.
7.

mediation,

State sovereignty, territorial inviolability, and non-interference
of Member States with the internal affairs of another Member State
15
were bedrock principles of the OAU from the time of its inception.
Thus, while certain Pan-African principles of the Casablanca Group
are embodied in the Charter, the Monrovia Group's moderate
approach, which emphasized the independence of the states,
appeared to have been more thoroughly adopted. 16 The importance of
the new independence of African states to the drafters of the OAU
Charter is evident in the Preamble, 17 as well as in Articles 2 and 3.18

14.
See id. at 54-55.
15.
Id.; NALDI, AN ANALYSIs, supra note 3, at 5.
16.
AMADU SESAY ET AL., THE OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS 3 (1984); SELECTED
DOCUMENTS, supra note 6, at 51.
17.
The Preamble to the OAU Charter states:
We, the Heads of African States and Governments assembled in the City of
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, [c]onvinced that it is the inalienable right of all people
to control their own destiny . . . [d]etermined to safeguard and consolidate the
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Perhaps African nations were reluctant to cede such hard-won power
to a new organization, despite the fact that they were members of it.
The respect for the sovereignty of states and the principle of noninterference embodied in the OAU Charter mirrors similar provisions
of the U.N. Charter.1 9 In fact, the U.N. Charter had a significant
impact on the thinking of the African leaders who drafted the OAU
Charter. 20 The OAU Charter mimicked the U.N. Charter insofar as it
encouraged international cooperation and solidarity between African
states and promoted self-determination and self-rule. 21 The OAU
Charter also explicitly endorsed the principles of the U.N. Charter
22
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The U.N. Charter and the OAU Charter differed, however, in at
least one important way: the U.N. Charter explicitly stated that
international peace and security were top priorities, whereas the
OAU Charter did not. 23
Even though peace and security were
necessary to accomplish the goals of the OAU (and were mentioned in
Article 2 of the Charter), it was clear from its inception that neither
was a priority for the organization. 24 More importantly, while both
the U.N. and OAU Charters explicitly call for the organizations to
avoid involving themselves in the internal affairs of their members,
only the OAU would ultimately adopt a rigid adherence to this
25
doctrine.
The inviolability of territorial boundaries was considered an
extremely important principle of the OAU Charter. 26 So important
was this principle that the Charter went further than its U.N.
counterpart, by tacitly prohibiting any action that might undermine
territorial integrity (not just action that constituted a threat or use of
force, as did the U.N. Charter). 27 The respect for territorial integrity
of Member States led them to accept after independence the principle

hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
our states, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms.
OAU Charter, supra note 11 (emphasis in original).
18.
See supra notes 11-12.
19.
James O.C. Jonah, The OAU: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution, in THE
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AFTER THIRTY YEARS 3, 9 (Yassin El-Ayouty ed.,

1994).
20.
SESAY ET AL., supra note 14, at 3.
21.
Berhanykun Andemicael, OAU-UN Relations in a Changing World, in THE
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AFTER THIRTY YEARS, supra note 17, at 119, 120.
22.
OAU Charter, supra note 11, art. 2(e).
23.
Andemicael, supra note 19, at 120.
24.

Id.

25.

Munya, supra note 3, at 584.
OAU Charter, supra note 11, art. 3(3); NALDI, AN ANALYSIS, supra note 3,

26.

at 9.
27.

NALDI, AN ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 8.
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of uti possidetis with regard to state boundaries. 2 8 Uti possidetis
provides that frontiers that were determined by colonial powers prior
to independence were not to be altered, and would form the
29
permanent boundaries of the independent African states.
While uti possidetis was implicitly recognized in Article 3,
Paragraph 3 of the OAU Charter, 30 the OAU clarified the issue by
explicitly recognizing the principle in 1964.31 The principle was
32
adopted to curb interstate conflicts resulting from border disputes.
Its inclusion in the OAU Charter was also the practical result of the
fact that at the time, many states had ongoing internal conflicts in
which they did not want the OAU to interfere. 3 3 The thinking behind
the use of this principle was that maintaining established colonial
borders would avoid conflicts between states that would inevitably
34
erupt in the process of drawing new borders.
B. OA U Intervention in Africa
Despite the goal of eliminating interstate conflicts due to border
disputes, the first test of the OAU's ability to resolve a crisis between
members arose out of such a dispute. 35 In 1963, hostilities erupted
36
between Morocco and Algeria as a result of a disputed frontier.
Algeria requested the intervention of the OAU, which convened its
Council of Ministers. 37 The Council's recommendations led to a
cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of troops, and eventually to a
bilateral agreement between the two parties. 38 The OAU's first
attempt at resolving a major crisis between its members met with
39
success.
The Nigerian civil war that took place between 1967 and 1970
tested the OAU's ability to strictly adhere to its policy of noninterference with the internal affairs of its members. 40
While
stressing that it had no intention to interfere, the OAU nonetheless
condemned secession within any Member State at its Fourth

28.
29.
30.

Id. at 9.
Id.
See supra note 12.

31.

NALDI, AN ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 9.

32.

Stephen J. Stedman, Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa, in

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT 235, 240 (Michael E. Brown
ed., 1996).

33.

Jonah, supra note 17, at 9.

34.
35.
36.
37.

See Stedman, supra note 30, at 240.
NALDI, AN ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 34.
Id.
Id.

38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 35.

40.

Id. at 37.
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Assembly Meeting in Kinshasa in September 1967. 4 1 The OAU also
created a committee which affirmed the OAU's support of the
Nigerian government during a visit to Nigeria. 42 It further called
upon all Member States to avoid any action that would have a
negative effect on the peace, unity, and territorial integrity of
Nigeria, 43 seeming to indicate that support of the breakaway group
was against the principles of the OAU.
The OAU's involvement in the Nigerian civil war, while political
in nature only, seemed to demonstrate a wavering from the strict
principle of non-interference in internal state affairs that its Charter
When the federal government of Nigeria finally
advocated. 44
prevailed in the conflict, the government and the former rebels
acknowledged the role of the OAU in reconciling post-conflict
differences by encouraging the parties to implement a general
45
amnesty and a national reconciliation.
The conflict in Chad during the early 1980s resulted in the
OAU's first attempt at peacekeeping. 46 Rival factions in Chad had
been warring for a considerable period of time, and Libyan military
intervention in the conflict finally prompted the OAU to get
involved. 47 An OAU peacekeeping force was endorsed by the OAU at
a Summit Conference in Nairobi in 1981.48 Two preconditions to the
deployment of the force were set: (1) the force must be invited by the
Chadian government, in accordance with U.N. principles, and (2) the
Libyan troops had to be withdrawn. 49 The first precondition, that of
the consent and cooperation of the government of the state in which
the organization seeks to deploy a peacekeeping force, is a clear
50
recognition of the OAU principle of respect of state sovereignty.
This principle has characterized OAU peacekeeping operations
51
throughout its history.
The OAU's attempt at peacekeeping in Chad has been described
as an "abject failure. '52 The role that the OAU envisioned itself
serving was that of a neutral force to provide peace for free elections

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Munya, supra note 3, at 574.

45.

NALDI, AN ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 38.

46.
Id. at 78.
47.
Id. at 73-77.
48.
Id. at 77.
49.
Id. at 27.
Jeremy Levitt, Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution: Africa50.
Regional Strategies for the Prevention of Displacement and Protection of Displaced
Persons: The Cases of the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD,11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 39, 57 (2001).
Id.
51.
NALDI, AN ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 28.
52.
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to occur. 53 The warring parties' failure to negotiate, however,
ultimately led to additional conflict, which resulted in the withdrawal
of the OAU forces in mid-1982 without having accomplished their
objective. 54 The failure of this mission was blamed on multiple
causes, including a mandate that was unclear to the Chadian
government (who thought the OAU would assist in fighting against
the rebels) and a lack of logistical and financial resources. 55 Of the
six countries that pledged to form peacekeeping units, only threeNigeria, Senegal, and Zaire-actually did so. 56 The initial estimated
cost of a peacekeeping mission of 5,000 men was $192 million, which
was ten times the annual budget of the OAU at the time. 5 7
Eventually, 3,000 men were sent, mostly from Nigeria. 58 The OAU's
failed peacekeeping mission in Chad left the future status of OAU
peacekeeping forces in serious doubt. 59
The conflict in Rwanda in the early 1990s highlighted both the
depth of the internal problems faced by some African countries and
the inefficacy of international organizations to manage these
problems. While the OAU and the U.N. enjoyed some limited
successes in the form of political pressure and temporary peace
treaties,60 the stark fact remains that over the course of a few months
6
in 1994, roughly 800,000 Rwandans were victims of genocide. '
Rwanda was to be a test case for a new, more interventionist role
to be played by the OAU in African conflicts. 6 2 In 1990, following an
incursion into Rwandan territory by a rebel group, OAU
peacekeepers, in the form of military observers, were dispatched to
Rwanda.6 3 The OAU had a difficult time initially putting together its
peacekeeping force, and it did not realize its target number of
64
peacekeepers by the mission's end.
The first OAU peacekeeping mission to Rwanda fielded forty
military observers, while the second mission, which followed on its
heels, had 132 observers. 65 Despite the modest manpower of these
missions, the OAU's efforts in Rwanda are generally considered a

53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.

56.
ERIC G. BERMAN & KATIE E. SAMS, PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA: CAPABILITIES
AND CULPABILITIES 53 (United Nations 2000).

57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 29.

60.
Id. at 60-61; GINO J. NALDI, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY 7 (2nd
ed. 1999) [hereinafter NALDI, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY].

61.

Stedman, supra note 30, at 235.

62.

BERMAN & SAMS, supra note 54, at 58.

63.

Id. at 59.

64.

Id.

65.

Id. at 59-60.
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success. The willingness of the OAU to take action, coupled with its
ability to exert constant political pressure, finally caused the U.N. to
send a peacekeeping mission of its own to Rwanda. 66 The U.N.'s
peacekeeping mission-known as the U.N. Assistance Mission for
Rwanda (UNAMIR)-ultimately comprised 2,608 individuals, and
when the mandate for the OAU's force expired, it was integrated into
UNAMIR. 67
Eventually, as the bloodshed continued, the U.N.
Security Council concluded that the situation in Rwanda constituted
a threat to international peace and security. The Security Council
authorized UNAMIR to use force to protect civilians, in accordance
with Article 42 of the U.N. Charter. 68 Tragically, the interventions by
the U.N. and the OAU were largely ineffective, and did not prevent
69
the widespread slaughter of Rwandans.
Subsequent observer missions undertaken in Burundi and the
Comoros sought to capitalize on the "success" of the OAU's Rwandan
force. 70 The hope was that the U.N. would eventually intervene to
establish peacekeeping missions of its own following action by the
OAU, just as it had done in Rwanda. 71 Despite the fact that the U.N.
failed to intervene, and the modest size of the forces (thirty-three in
Burundi, twenty in the Comoros), the missions were successful in at
least some ways. 72 In Burundi, the intervention of the OAU was
thought to have prevented some instances of conflict between warring
factions, whereas in the Comoros, the forces successfully served in the
role of mediator and succeeded in providing humanitarian
73
assistance.
C. Was the OAU Effective at African Conflict Maintenance?
Conflict maintenance, or the process of dealing with conflicts,
can be divided into three interdependent processes: (1) conflict

66.
67.

Id. at 60-61.
Id.

68.

NALDI, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, supra note 58, at 7; U.N.

Charter art. 42.
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations,
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See NALDI, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, supra note 58, at 7.
BERMAN & SAMS, supra note 54, at 68.
Id.
Id. at 70-71.
Id.
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74
prevention, (2) conflict management, and (3) conflict resolution.
Conflict prevention aims at stopping conflicts before they begin and
addressing the issues that could give rise to future conflict. 75 Conflict
76
management attempts to stop conflict once it has already begun.
Conflict resolution deals with residual effects of conflict once it has
actively ceased, and seeks to address both the elimination of residual
strife that may cause future conflict, and to rebuild political and other
77
essential structures for the proper functioning of the state.
Conflict prevention relies primarily on viable early warning and
78
risk assessment capabilities of responsible institutional actors.
This warning and risk assessment is primarily accomplished through
quality field intelligence and the early reporting of conflicts or
potential conflicts to the appropriate authorities. 79
Once the
institutional actor has properly assessed the risk of conflict,
preventative diplomacy and possible deployment of peacekeepers can
take place in the hope of averting conflict.80
The OAU was the most successful of African organizations in the
area of conflict prevention.8 1 Some examples include the OAU's
successfully mediated peace treaty following disputed elections in
Congo (Brazzaville), and the Arusha Accord of 1993, which halted
(albeit temporarily) the violence in Rwanda.8 2 While somewhat
successful in the area of preventative diplomacy, the OAU's efforts at
conflict prevention have been seriously hampered by its lack of
operational intelligence.8 3 Without such intelligence, the OAU could
not effectively predict and assess situations that may give rise to
conflict.8 4
Furthermore, the OAU lacked full preventative
deployment capabilities, whereby peacekeepers could be placed in
85
areas of risk prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
Conflict management attempts to establish order by using
preventative diplomacy, sanctions, peacekeeping, peace enforcement,
and humanitarian intervention where necessary.8 6
The OAU's

74.

Levitt, supra note 48, at 55.

75.
Id. at 56.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id. at 54.
81.
Id. at 55.
82.
Id.
83.
The OAU's 1981 peacekeeping mission in Chad is an example of failure of
proper reporting. Both the Secretary-General and the Assembly of Heads of State (who
made the decisions regarding the mission) had a difficult time getting good information
about what was happening in Chad. Id. at 56.
84.
Id. at 56.
85.
Id.
86.
Id. at 56-57.
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capability to effectively manage conflict was effectively thwarted by a
number of its institutional characteristics. The principle of noninterference in its Charter required the OAU to obtain permission of
a Member State prior to interfering in any internal conflict.8 7 Peace
enforcement involves the use of military force to compel warring
parties to reach peace settlements and is differentiated from
peacekeeping in that permission of the parties or the state is not a
prerequisite.8 8 Thus, peace enforcement and humanitarian missions
without permission were essentially banned by the OAU Charter.
Even peacekeeping missions (in which consent is given) may have
been impermissible; it is suggested that the only reason the OAU
could interfere in Chad is because other nations (notably, Libya) were
The lack of enforcement
involved in the conflict already.8 9
mechanisms within the OAU Charter meant that sanctions would
management was
have been wholly ineffective. Thus, OAU conflict
90
essentially limited to preventative diplomacy.
Conflict resolution is aimed at securing a sustainable peace
following the cessation of hostilities. 9 1 The OAU's strength in
diplomacy resulted in some successes in conflict resolution, most
notably in Sierra Leone, where it affected a U.N. arms embargo on an
Often,
illegal military junta that was running the country. 92
however, institutional limitations, both normative and structural,
prevented the OAU from acting effectively in resolving many
conflicts. 93 Furthermore, the OAU lacked the capability to ensure,
through peacekeepers, that the peace was kept following the signing
94
of a treaty.
In response to some of the shortcomings of the OAU's conflict
maintenance capabilities, the OAU formally adopted the Mechanism
for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (the
Mechanism) at the OAU Summit in Cairo in June 1993. 95 The
Mechanism gave power to the OAU to deploy civilian and military
missions for purposes of monitoring and observation to areas in which
conflict was occurring. 96 The Mechanism thus indicated that the
OAU was authorized to undertake a new, more interventionist

87.
Id. at 57.
Stedman, supra note 30, at 250.
88.
89.
Jonah, supranote 17, at 9.
90.
Levitt, supra note 48, at 58.
Id. at 47.
91.
Id. at 59.
92.
Id.
93.
Id. at 76-77.
94.
BERMAN & SAMS, supra note 54, at 61.
95.
96.
Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the
Establishment with in the OAU a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management,
and Resolution 15, reprinted in SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 6, at 223.
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approach.9 7 It was clear from the outset, however, that the primary
purpose of the Mechanism was to prevent conflict rather than to
manage or resolve it.9 8 In fact, according to the Director of Cabinet
for the OAU Secretary-General, Said Djinnit, "a clear consensus
against the involvement of the OAU in peacekeeping" was reached at
the Dakar Summit in July 1992. 99 Given the institutional limitations
of the OAU, including the self-interest of African heads of state, this
restriction on the power of the OAU was not surprising.
D. Normative, Structural,and PracticalLimitations of the OAU
The normative structure of the OAU led to success in resolving
certain species of conflicts and failure when dealing with other forms.
The OAU was able to avoid many potential conflicts arising from
border disputes through its early implicit inclusion, and later explicit
adoption, of the principle of uti possidetis.0 0 In some cases in which
such conflicts arose anyway, such as the Algeria-Morocco border
conflict, the OAU was able to lay the ground work for a political
solution. 10 1 The explicit inclusion of territorial integrity of states as a
defining principle of the OAU Charter indicates a strong belief in this
principle. Dedication to this principle, coupled with the legal backing
of the Charter, likely fostered an environment conducive to resolution
10 2
of border disputes, and led to OAU successes in this area.
The OAU was also successful in promoting other principles and
goals announced in it Charter.
Two of its more notable
accomplishments include its fight for decolonization and the
03
declaration of the continent of Africa as a nuclear-free zone.'
Article 3, Paragraph 6 of the OAU Charter states that the Member
States must adhere to an "absolute dedication to the total
emancipation of Africa.' 0 4
To this end, the OAU created the
Liberation Committee in 1963, which sought to end colonial
occupation through various means, including assistance to liberation
movements and diplomatic pressure, to achieve liberation goals at the
United Nations. 0 5 The OAU also adopted the Pelindaba Treaty in
1995, which calls on all African nations to establish Africa as a

97.

See BERMAN & SAMS, supra note 54, at 61.

98.
99.

Id. at 61-62.
Id.

100.

See NALDI, AN ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 8.

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 35.
Munya, supra note 3, at 579.
Id. at 579-80; SESAY ET AL., supra note 14, at 14-20, 92.
OAU Charter, supra note 11, art. 3(6).

105.

SESAY ET AL., supra note 14, at 11-12; TWENTY YEARS, supra note 1, at 7.

556

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL.
39.'543
[

nuclear-free zone.1 0 6 The adoption of this treaty is in line with the
goals of peace and security of the African continent, as stated in the
Preamble of the OAU Charter (where it states that "conditions for
peace and security must be established and maintained"), 10 7 and
Article 2 of the Charter (where it calls for "cooperation for defense
10 8
and security").
While the principles announced in the OAU Charter have led to
some tangible results on the continent, it is undeniable that these
principles also restrained the actions of the OAU, especially in the
sphere of conflict management and resolution.' 0 9 The principle of
sovereign equality that formed the foundation of the Charter has tied
the hands of the OAU in many devastating conflicts. 110 It has been
noted that this principle greatly, if not entirely, impaired the OAU's
ability to manage or resolve the internal conflicts of Member
States."' Given that colonial borders were drawn without regard to
tribal or ethnic divisions, 112 and these borders were held inviolable by
the OAU Charter, it is ironic that the very document that sought to
prevent conflict over borders actually insured that conflict within
borders would take place. 113 What made this problem all the more
intractable is that the Charter probably succeeded in minimizing the
type of conflict over which the OAU had legal control (interstate
conflict), at the expense of creating additional conflict over which it
114
had no legal control (intrastate conflict).
While U.N. Charter provisions provide for respect for territorial
integrity, state sovereignty, and non-interference, 1 15 the post-Cold
116
War period has seen the U.N. interpret these principles liberally.
The result has been that in certain circumstances, the U.N. has
approved interference, including with force, in the internal affairs of
Member States. 117 Most notably, the U.N. approved a peacekeeping
mission in Somalia in 1992, and the deployment of an international
force in Haiti to restore the ousted government of Jean-Bertrand
Aristide. 118 In undertaking such missions, the U.N. has implicitly

106.
SELECTED
107.
108.
109.
110.
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112.
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OAU Charter, supra note 11, pmbl.
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See Munya, supra note 3, at 584-86.
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Id.; Jonah, supra note 17, at 9.
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Id. at 585.
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recognized that the present reality calls for a flexible interpretation of
the principles of sovereignty. 119 Such an approach will allow the U.N.
to deal with the threats to "international peace and security" (as
Chapter VII of the Charter authorizes it to do) 120 that are internal in
origin, but may have broader, transnational effects.
The OAU adhered to a strict and rigid interpretation of the
doctrine of sovereignty and territorial integrity that prevented it from
engaging in many devastating conflicts in Africa. 121 This inflexible
approach was no doubt attributable to the extreme deference to
sovereignty that African leaders incorporated into the OAU Charter,
and the reluctance to stray from it. As former U.N. staffer Yassin ElAyouty noted in his assessment of the OAU in 1993, "The world has
completely changed, since 1989 [and the end of the Cold War]; the
OAU has not, since 1963."122 El-Ayouty further noted that to remain
relevant and effective, the OAU would have to recognize
humanitarian intervention to protect human rights as an emerging
123
rule of customary international law.
The fact that such intervention would directly conflict with the
OAU's absolute deference to the principle of sovereign integrity and
non-interference meant that a very difficult conceptual shift was
necessary for the OAU to remain a viable institution that was in tune
with the changing needs of Africa. 124 The lack of provisions in the
OAU Charter analogous to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter also
placed the constitutional justification for such a conceptual shift on
125
shaky ground.
The effectiveness of the OAU as an organization was also
hindered by limitations in its structure and distribution of powers. 126
It has been noted that the power was distributed very unevenly, and
that almost all of its power rests with one group: the Assembly of
Heads of State. 12 7 It is not surprising, then, that a prominent African
statesman, former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, noted that
"the OAU exists only for the protection of African Heads of State. ' 128

119.
See id. (discussing the U.N.'s evolving interpretation of the principle of
sovereignty and exercise of its Chapter VII powers to intervene forcefully where
necessary to "maintain or restore international peace and security").
120.
See U.N. Charter art. 39-51.
121.
Munya, supra note 3, at 584; Corinne A. A. Packer & Donald Rukare, The
New African Union and its Constitutive Act, 96 AM. J. INT'L. L. 365, 367 (2002).
122.
Yassin El-Ayouty, An OAU for the Future: An Assessment, in THE
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AFTER THIRTY YEARS, supra note 17, at 179, 179.
123.
Id. at 186.
124.
Id. at 186-88.
125.
See NALDI, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, supra note 58, at 37.
126.
Munya, supra note 3, at 586-89.
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Id. at 586-87.
El-Ayouty, supra note 120, at 179.
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Getting African heads of state to look beyond their own personal and
national interests proved to be difficult, further frustrating the
129
progress of OAU meetings.
The OAU Secretary-General had neither the power to resolve
conflicts diplomatically on his own directive, nor the power to initiate
any review of a situation he believed constituted a threat to peace and
security in Africa. 130 The failure to distribute powers more evenly,
particularly with regard to the function of the Secretary-General, was
131
a source of great structural ineffectiveness in the OAU.
Another serious structural hindrance to the OAU's effectiveness
was its complete lack of an enforcement mechanism for compelling
Member States to respect its decisions. 132
The OAU had no
"mandatory powers," and many of its decisions were essentially
recommendations. 1 33 The OAU had no ability to force consensus or
demand the obedience of its Member States, other than mobilization
of public opinion against the recalcitrant state. 134 The OAU Charter
also did not provide for the creation of a body to enforce decisions
with regard to peace and security. 13 5 The OAU lost a lot of its
legitimacy in the eyes of Member States as a result of its inability to
136
enforce its decisions.
The OAU's decision-making process was also flawed. 137 The
requirement of two-thirds of the members of the Assembly of Heads of
State for a quorum, coupled with a two-thirds majority voting system,
138
meant that delay in dealing with important issues was inevitable.
Furthermore, even when decisions were made, the OAU was thought
to rely too heavily on diplomacy. 139
The result was often a
temporarily alleviated conflict that later resurfaced due to the failure
140
of the OAU to address the root causes of the conflict.
While not the result of Charter-based limitations, lack of
financial resources also had a severe impact on the functioning of the
OAU. 14 1 For example, the cost of the OAU's peacekeeping mission in
Chad was well beyond its entire annual budget. 142 The lack of funds
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for the Chadian intervention led to a complete lack of a uniform
command structure (resulting from the fact that each donor country
managed and paid their own troops), which greatly inhibited the
effectiveness of the mission. 143 International interest in Africa also
waned since the end of the Cold War, and the limited aid given to
Africa afterwards exacerbated the financial woes of the OAU. 144 The
OAU's lack of an enforcement mechanism also meant that Member
States could completely avoid their financial obligations to the OAU
145
without repercussions.

II. THE

AFRICAN UNION

A. The Formationof a New African IntercontinentalOrganization
The Constitutive Act of the AU was adopted on July 11, 2000, in
1 46
Lome, Togo by the Assembly of Heads of Government of the OAU.
The Constitutive Act came into effect on May 26, 2001, upon
ratification by Nigeria.' 4 7 At this point, the OAU ceased to exist as a
legal entity, and the AU emerged in its place. 148 The AU became
operationally effective on July 10, 2002, and the Constitutive Act has
14 9
currently been ratified by all fifty-three African nations.
African leaders viewed the formation of the AU as a reformation
of the OAU, rather than the creation of an entirely new entity. 150
The AU was designed to address some of the shortcomings of the
151
OAU, including its inability to deal effectively with deadly conflict.
The OAU was founded to spur decolonization and development, as
well as to combat apartheid 152 and it had accomplished much toward
these goals, particularly decolonization and apartheid. 153 With many
of the initial goals of the OAU accomplished, African leaders sought
to create an entity that would be more effective in dealing with the
154
current problems faced by the people of Africa.

143.
144.
145.
146.

Jonah, supra note 17, at 8.
See Munya, supra note 3, at 538; see also Stedman, supra note 30, at 237.
Packer & Rukare, supra note 119, at 369.
The Constitutive Act of the African Union, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15 (July

11, 2000), reprinted in SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 6, at 37 [hereinafter AU

Constitutive Act].
147.

SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 6, at 35.

148.
149.

Id. at 36; Packer & Rukare, supra note 119, at 365.
SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 6, at 36; AU Constitutive Act, supra

note 144.

150.

Packer & Rukare, supra note 119, at 365.

151.

SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 6, at 35.

152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id.; Packer & Rukare, supra note 119, at 366.

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

560

[VOL. 39.543

The Constitutive Act of the AU provides in Article 3 the
objectives of the new Union:
Article 3
Objectives
The objectives of the Union shall be to:
between the African

(a)

achieve greater unity and solidarity
countries and the peoples of Africa;

(b)

defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of
its Member States;

(c)

accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the
continent;
promote and defend African common positions on issues of
interest to the continent and its peoples;

(d)
(e)

encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights;

(f)
(g)

promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;
promote democratic principles and institutions,
participation and good governance;

(h)

promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance
with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and
other relevant human rights instruments;
establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to
play its rightful role in the global economy and in international
negotiations;
promote sustainable development at the economic, social, and

(i)

()

popular

cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies;
(k)

promote co-operation in all fields of human activity to raise the
living standards of African peoples;

(1) coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and
future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual
attainment of the objectives of the Union;
(m) advance the development of the continent by promoting research
in all fields, in particular science and technology;
(n) work with relevant international partners in the eradication of
preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the
55
continent.1

The principles of the AU were announced in Article 4 of the
Constitutive Act:
Principles
The Union shall function in accordance with the following principles:
(a)
(b)

155.

sovereign equality and interdependence among Member
States of the Union;
respect of borders existing on achievement of independence;

AU Constitutive Act, supra note 144, art. 3.
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(c)

participation of the African peoples in the activities of the
Union;

(d)

establishment of a common defense policy for the African
Continent;

(e)

peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States of the
Union through such appropriate means as may decided
upon by the Assembly;
prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among

(f)

Member States of the Union;
(g)
(h)

non-interference by any Member State in the internal
affairs of another;
the right of the Union to intervene if a Member State
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes
against humanity;

(i)

peaceful co-existence of Member States and their right to
live in peace and security;

(j)

the right of Member States to request intervention from the
Union in order to restore peace and security;
promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the
Union;

(k)
(1)

promotion of gender equality;

(m) respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of
law and good governance;
(n) promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic
development;
(o)

(p)

respect for sanctity of human life, condemnation and
rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of
terrorism and subversive activities;
condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of
government. 156

B. Differences between the AU Charterand the OAU Charter
The Preamble to the Constitutive Act explicitly recognizes the
problems Africa faces in terms of armed conflict and the effect that
these conflicts have on human rights. 157 The objectives of the AU, as

156.
157.

Id. art. 4.
See id. The Preamble to the Constitutive Act of the African Union states:

Conscious of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major
impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need
to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the
implementation of our development and integration agenda ....
Determined
to promote and protect human and peoples' rights, consolidate democratic
institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law;
Further determined to take all necessary measures to strengthen our common
institutions and provide them with the necessary powers and resources to
enable them to discharge their respective mandates effectively ....
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stated in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act, include to "promote peace,
security, and stability on the continent 158 and to "promote and
protect human and peoples' rights." 15 9 The objectives also include to
"defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of
Member States,"'160 which essentially reproduces Article 2(1)(c) of the
OAU Charter.16 ' Article 3(a) of the Constitutive Act calls for the
achievement of "greater unity and solidarity" between nations and
people in Africa, indicating that the OAU had not been effective
enough at "promot[ing] the unity and solidarity of African States," as
162
called for in Article 2(1)(a) of the OAU Charter.
The announced principles of the AU embodied in Article 4 of the
Constitutive Act reflect a major shift in thinking from the OAU
Charter. Whereas the OAU Charter adheres to the principle of the
"sovereign equality of all Member States,"'163 the Constitutive Act
rephrases the principle as respect for the "sovereign equality and
interdependence among Member States of the Union."'1 64 While the
OAU Charter speaks of "respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent
existence,"1165 the Constitutive Act speaks only of "respect for borders
'166
existing on achievement of independence.
The most drastic differences between the Constitutive Act and
the OAU Charter are with regard to intervention. The OAU Charter
adopts a rigid policy of "non-interference in the internal affairs of
States.' 16 7 While the Constitutive Act provides for "non-interference
of any Member State in the internal affairs of another,"' 6 8 it allows for
"the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely:
war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.' 1 69
The
importance of this provision cannot be overstated; whereas the OAU
was essentially wholly restricted from intervening in internal affairs
as a result of its charter, the AU has explicitly been granted authority

Id. (emphasis added).
158.
Id. art. 3(f).
159.
Id. art. 3(h). The full text of 3(h) reads "to promote and protect human and
peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
and other relevant human rights instruments."
160.
Id. art. 3(b).
161.
OAU Charter, supranote 11, art. 2(1)(c).
162.
AU Constitutive Act, supranote 144, art. 3(a); OAU Charter, supranote 11,
art. 2(1)(a).
163.
OAU Charter, supranote 11, art. 3(1).
164.
AU Constitutive Act, supranote 148, art. 4(a) (emphasis added).
165.
OAU Charter, supranote 11, art. 3(3).
166.
AU Constitutive Act, supranote 144, art. 4(b).
167.
OAU Charter, supranote 11, art. 3(2).
168.
AU Constitutive Act, supra note 144, art. 4(g) (emphasis added).
169.
Id. art. 4(h).
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to intervene in internal affairs of its members under certain
circumstances.
The OAU's policy of noninterference was further eroded by the
Constitutive Act's refusal to recognize illegal governments that take
power in African countries. 170 The OAU had no similar provision,
and as a result, the seizing of power by such governments often went
unchecked. 171 The interventionist tone of the Constitutive Act goes
even further to provide for the existence of "the right of Member
States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore
peace and security." 172 It also advocates "the establishment of a
1 73
common defense policy for the African Continent."'
The normative differences between the AU and the OAU are
significant, as is obvious in a comparison between the OAU Charter
and the Constitutive Act. These normative differences are reflective
of African leaders' understanding that a new organization, with new
powers and principles, was necessary to deal with current problems
faced by Africans. 174 A comparison between the OAU Charter and
the Constitutive Act of the AU reveal two major differences that are
important in addressing conflict: (1) the Constitutive Act has made a
significant move away from the notion of each Member State as a
separate, inviolable entity and (2) has provided the normative
structure for a much more interventionist policy on the part of the
AU. Thus, the normative barriers to intervention that were written
into the OAU Charter have been largely removed by the much more
permissive language of the Constitutive Act.
While the normative structure of the AU is largely different than
its predecessor, the power structure of the AU is similar in some ways
to that of the OAU. 175 The Assembly of the Union is the supreme
organ of the AU, and is composed of the fifty-three heads of African
states, just as was the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of
the OAU.1 76 Voting on substantive matters is done "by consensus
or . . ." on a two-thirds majority basis, while procedural matters only
require the vote of a simple majority. 177
Two-thirds of the
membership of the Assembly of the Union must be present to form a
quorum at any meeting of the Assembly. 178 Excluding the provision
that votes on substantive matters are first done by consensus, all of

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. art. 4(p).
Packer & Rukare, supra note 119, at 374.
AU Constitutive Act, supra note 144, art. 4(j).
Id. art. 4(d).
See Packer & Rukare, supra note 119, at 369-70.
See id. at 374-77.
Id. at 374; AU Constitutive Act, supra note 144, art. 6.
AU Constitutive Act, supra note 144, art. 7(1).
Id. art. 7(2).
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these provisions are identical to those applicable to the Assembly of
179
Heads of State and Government of the OAU.
Article 10 of the Constitutive Act establishes the Executive
Council, which is comprised of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of
Member States, or other Ministers or authorities designated by the
Member State. 180 The Executive Council may have responsibilities
delegated to it by the Assembly, and is essentially the same as the
OAU's Council of Ministers both in terms of composition and
181
responsibilities.
Article 20 of the Constitutive Act provides for the creation of the
Commission of the AU, which is the Secretariat of the Union.18 2 The
duties, powers, and responsibilities of the Commission are largely
unaddressed in the Constitutive Act, which simply provides that the
8 3
functions of the Commission will be determined by the Assembly.
An important question arose: would the Commission have more
The lack of
power than the OAU Secretary-General did?
constitutionally-delineated limitations on the Commission's power
indicates that this is a possibility, and some commentators have
speculated that the broader powers of the AU necessitate a more
powerful and active Secretariat. 184 If the Commission were to be
given greater powers, it could take a more active role in diplomacy
and in initiating procedures for conflict maintenance. Such powers
would alleviate some of the ineffectiveness experienced by the OAU
as a result of its uneven power distribution.
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established by
protocol on July 10, 2002, pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constitutive
Act.18 5 It is comprised of fifteen members, ten of which serve for two
years, and five of which serve for three years.'8 6 The PSC works in
87
It
conjunction with the Chairperson of the Commission of the AU.'
is charged with authorizing deployment and deciding the mandate of
"peace support missions," recommending armed intervention to the
Assembly in "grave circumstances," initiating sanctions on
governments that take power unconstitutionally, and other related

179.
OAU Charter, supra note 11, art. 10.
180.
AU Constitutive Act, supranote 144, art. 7(1).
181.
See OAU Charter, supra note 11, arts. 12-15; Packer & Rukare, supra note
119, at 375.
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183.
Id. art. 20(3).
184.
Packer & Rukare, supra note 119, at 375.
185.
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of
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Welcome.htm (follow "Organs" hyperlink; then follow "Peace and Security Council"
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Protocol].
186.
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peace and security functions. 188
The PSC is, in many ways,
analogous to the U.N. Security Council; however, the ability to use
force to intervene in an internal conflict without a Member State's
permission is vested with the Assembly instead of the PSC. 189
The Chairperson of the Commission, as part of the PSC, has the
authority to bring matters believed to pose a threat to peace or
security to the attention of the PSC. 190 The Chairperson can also use
his or her diplomatic capabilities, either at his or her own initiative or
the direction of the PSC, to prevent and resolve conflicts and promote
peace-building. 19 1 The role of the Chairperson as part of the PSC
indicates a broader role for the Commission in the AU, and a more
even distribution of powers than that which existed in the OAU.
The Protocol that established the PSC attempted to lay the
ground work for more effective conflict maintenance. Preventative
diplomacy forms the foundation of AU conflict prevention, with both
the Chairperson of the Commission (Article 10 of the Protocol) and
the Panel of the Wise (Article 11; comprised of prominent African
figures) charged with using their "good offices" to avoid conflict
through diplomacy. 19 2 More importantly, the Protocol establishes an
early warning system (Article 12) that was lacking in the OAU, with
1 93
a central command and regional observation and monitoring units.
These units are charged with monitoring a variety of "political,
economic, social, military, and humanitarian" factors at the local
level. 194 The information the units gather will be passed along to the
Chairperson of the Commission, who report to the PSC on matters of
195
importance.
C. Will the A U Be More Effective at African Conflict Maintenance
than the OAU?
Conflict management by the AU is likely to be more effective
given the broader mandate of the AU to involve itself in internal
affairs of its Member States. The ability to deploy peacekeepers,
peace enforcers, and humanitarian intervention without Member
State permission gives the AU the institutional capability to act to
restore or maintain peace in a wide variety of circumstances.
Furthermore, the AU's ability to impose serious sanctions (discussed
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below) on Member States that disregard its decisions (presumably
including demands for respecting a ceasefire) gives it additional
power in this area.
The AU will likely capitalize on its diplomatic expertise (as did
the OAU) to assist it in conflict resolution. The Protocol establishing
the PSC charges it with the tasks of ensuring the establishment of
conditions for post-conflict reconstruction, disarmament and
rehabilitation of combatants, and "resettlement and reintegration of
combatants. '196 The PSC would likely accomplish these tasks by
deploying peacekeepers to assist the people and the government of a
war-torn region. Its success in conflict resolution will be dependent
on the willingness and logistical capability of the PSC to deploy and
maintain peace-building forces in these areas.
The AU is structured to be much more effective in all areas of
conflict maintenance than was the OAU. Not only has it expanded
upon the OAU's diplomatic strengths (by, for example, giving the
Commission diplomatic responsibilities), but it has, at least in theory,
addressed many of the major shortcomings of the OAU. These
shortcomings included lack of quality operational intelligence and an
early warning system, lack of peace enforcement capabilities in
internal conflicts, and lack of coordination of post-conflict rebuilding.
While the institutional structure of the AU is an improvement, it
must implement these enhanced conflict maintenance capabilities in
order to prove itself to be truly superior to the OAU in resolving
conflict.
Perhaps one of the most important structural changes in the AU
is the creation of an enforcement mechanism to compel Member
States to comply with decisions of the Union and obligations resulting
from membership in it. Article 23 of the Constitutive Act provides for
the imposition of sanctions for default in payment of contributions to
the budget of the AU, as well as the possibility of sanctions for failure
to comply with the AU's decisions and policies. 197 Possible sanctions
for default of payment of dues include loss of "the right to speak at
meetings, to vote, [or] to present candidates" to the AU. 198 Failure to
comply with decisions and policies can bring harsher penalties,
including "denial of transport[ation] and communication links with
other Member States," as well as other political or economic measures
as authorized by the Assembly. 199
The enforcement mechanism embodied in the Constitutive Act
gives the AU the bite that was wholly lacking in the OAU, whose

196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. art. 14(3).
AU Constitutive Act, supra note 144, art. 20.
Id. art. 10(1).
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decisions were often treated as mere recommendations due to lack of
enforcement capabilities. 20 0 The enforcement mechanism, if utilized
fairly and effectively when Member States either ignore decisions of
the Union or fail to pay their dues, should give the AU legitimacy in
an area where the OAU had none.
There are a few notable omissions from the Constitutive Act of
the AU. A standing military force was not created, although the AU
is authorized by the Constitutive Act "to establish a 'common defense
policy' for Africa. 20 1 The failure to do so may be due to an
understanding of the economic limitations of the organization and the
political difficulties that would be encountered in staffing its
command. 20 2 It should be noted, however, that Member States were
called upon to form standby contingents for use in peacekeeping
missions in the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace
20 3
and Security Council of the AU.
The Constitutive Act also failed to specify how the AU would be
funded. 20 4 This failure is particularly notable given the fact that a
lack of financial resources was one of the major impediments to the
success of the OAU. 20 5 The Constitutive Act does provide for
sanctions for the failure of Member States to pay dues, 20 6 so
presumably once a method of collecting dues is established, it will be
enforced.
The ability of the AU to decide upon an acceptable
contributions scheme, and its subsequent effectiveness at enforcing
this obligation, remains to be seen, and will likely play a major role in
the success or failure of the Union to accomplish its objectives.
D. The A U and Peacekeeping: Darfuras a Litmus Test
The AU's first peacekeeping mission was undertaken in Burundi
in April 2003.207 A force of 3,000 peacekeepers from many African
nations was sent with the understanding that it was a temporary
measure until the U.N. deployed a peacekeeping mission to the
region.2 08 The mandate of the force was to "monitor and verify the
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implementation of' a ceasefire agreement signed between the
Burundian government and rebel forces. 20 9 To this end, it was
"charged with protecting government installations . . .facilitating
of the rebels," and establishing the ground work for
demobilization
2 10
elections.
The mission in Burundi experienced mixed success. 211 While the
ceasefire agreements were not fully implemented, the AU
peacekeepers stabilized 95% of the country and created adequate
The
conditions for the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers. 212
of
"facilitatea[d] ...delivery
successfully
also
peacekeepers
humanitarian assistance[, and] provide[d] protection [for] returning
leaders." 213 One of the major hindrances to the mission, however,
was reminiscent of those of its predecessor institution: a lack of
funding and a consequent breakdown of logistics. 2 14 Nevertheless,
the AU's mission was moderately successful, although the real test of
the AU's capabilities was yet to come.
Darfur is a region in western Sudan that is approximately the
size of France. 2 15 It is home to an estimated six million people. 216 In
February 2003, rebel groups from Darfur, whose population consists
mainly of non-Arab black Africans, took up arms against the Arabdominated Sudanese government, claiming that the government
In response, the
neglected and discriminated against them. 2 17
Sudanese government enlisted the aid of Arab militias, known as the
Janjaweed, to kill and terrorize large segments of the population of
Darfur. 218 Civilians in Darfur have reported that the Sudanese
military and the Janjaweed have engaged in joint missions attacking
villages in the area. 219 The Sudanese government claims it does not
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209.
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information" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 18, 2005).
217. Robinson, supra note 213.
Id.; Opheera McDoom, African Union Sends 300-Strong Protection Force
218.
into Darfur, THE INDEPENDENT (London), July 6, 2004, at 24; Colum Lynch, Darfur
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control the militias, but strong evidence exists that indicates
220
otherwise.
By late August of 2004, it was estimated that the Janjaweed had
caused 30,000 deaths, and was responsible for the forced
displacement of 1.2 million people. 22 1 In October 2004, the AU
222
reported that the number of refugees had increased to 1.5 million,
and by January 2005, the number had again increased to 2.3
million. 223 The U.N. concluded that between March and November of
2004, 70,000 had been killed or died of hunger in Darfur. 224 By
October 2005, it was estimated that 180,000 people had been killed or
225
died in Darfur as a direct or indirect result of the hostilities.
On May 25, 2004, the PSC of the AU authorized the Chairperson
22 6
of the Commission to deploy an AU observer mission in Darfur.
The mandate of the mission was to observe and monitor the progress
of the N'Djamena Humanitarian Cease-Fire Agreement signed by the
government of Sudan and the Darfurian rebels on April 8, 2004, and
to ensure compliance. 227 The government and the rebels agreed to
the formation of a Ceasefire Commission chaired by the AU to
monitor the progress of the ceasefire and the deployment of AU
228
observers in Darfur, a few days later.
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At its seventeenth meeting on October 20, 2004, the PSC
authorized an "enhancement" of the so-called African Mission in
Sudan (AMIS). 229 In addition to increasing the total size of the force
to 3,320 individuals, the mandate of AMIS was expanded to include
not only monitoring, "confidence-building," and securing delivery of
humanitarian relief, but significantly, to "protect civilians whom it
encounters under imminent threat in the immediate vicinity. '230 The
AU force in Darfur is thus authorized to use force under certain
circumstances to protect civilians.
The parties to the Darfur conflict signed various protocols in
November 2004 that emphasized an agreement to protect civilians
from harm, to allow free movement of humanitarian aid, and to
cooperate with AMIS' efforts to monitor the ceasefire. 231
The
government of Sudan also explicitly agreed to "neutralize and disarm
2 32
the Janjaweed," and to allow AMIS to monitor the disarmament.
UN resolutions calling for the government of Sudan to disarm
the Janjaweed and stabilize the Darfur region were subsequently
ignored, 233 and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan reported in early
December that the government had made no progress in disarming
234
the Janjaweed.
The U.N. stated, in a report dated January 25, 2005, that it has
concluded that while the acts committed in Darfur do not reflect a
policy of genocide, the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed "are
responsible for serious violations of international human rights and
235
humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law."
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The U.N. went on to state that "[tjhese acts were conducted on a
widespread and systematic6 basis, and therefore may amount to
23
crimes against humanity.
In late January 2005, the Assembly of the AU expressed its
determination to "take all appropriate measures against those
' 237
It
responsible for further obstructing the peace efforts in Darfur.
also authorized the PSC to "take all necessary measures to promote
an early negotiated solution. '23 8 Following the report of an AU
Assessment Team sent to Darfur to monitor the progress of AMIS,
the PSC authorized an increase in total strength of AMIS to 6,171
military personnel and 1,560 civilian police (6,200 peacekeepers were
reported to be in Darfur by October 2005).239 The communiqu6,
which authorized this force enhancement, noted that while the
parties' compliance with the Ceasefire Agreement was insufficient,
the government of Sudan had withdrawn some troops and bombers
240
from positions in Darfur, a move that was viewed favorably.
The AU moved forward on the diplomatic front by appointing
Salim A. Salim, "[f]ormer Secretary-General of the OAU, as the AU
Special Envoy for the Inter-Sudanese Political Talks on Darfur" in
May 2005.241 The PSC subsequently acknowledged the critical role of
diplomacy in ultimately resolving the political and socio-economic
issues that initially sparked the conflict in Darfur. 24 2 By July 2005,
the government of Sudan and the two major rebel factions, the Sudan
Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM), came to an agreement regarding basic principles
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that would underlie the peace talks. 24 3 The most notable of these
principles include the recognition of the equality, civil rights, and the
right to self-determination of all Sudanese without regard to ethnicity
or religion (including an agreement that a non-discrimination policy
would be written into the national constitution of Sudan), an
agreement that the people of Darfur would be represented in the
Sudanese government, and the participation of the citizens of Darfur
in any final peace agreement. 244 On October 3, 2005, the warring
parties finally began talks on the substantive issues relating to peace
in Darfur, with a focus on power sharing, wealth distribution, and
245
security arrangements.

III. WILL THE PROMISE OF THE AU BEAR FRUIT?

It is already apparent that some of the institutional limitations
of the OAU have been overcome in the AU, particularly with regard
to normative boundaries. Had the Darfur conflict erupted ten years
earlier, it is likely that the OAU could not have gotten involved, since
the nature of the Darfur conflict is purely internal. The fact that the
AU did involve itself quickly in the conflict (at least once a ceasefire
agreement had been signed) indicates that its members envision the
institution taking a more proactive role in internal conflict
management and resolution in Africa. There is an understanding
among African leaders that Darfur is a test case for the efficacy of the
newly-minted AU, and that its performance in this conflict will reflect
on its commitment to address issues of peace and security as stated in
the Constitutive Act. 246
The fact that the Sudanese government and the rebels in Darfur
have made various agreements at the behest of the AU, and agreed to
submit to AU authority in monitoring the ceasefire, indicates that
these parties recognize that the AU wields at least some power over
them. Certainly, the fact that the Sudanese government agreed to
the deployment of armed soldiers that are not controlled by it within
its sovereign territory is strong evidence of the recognition of the AU's
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legitimate role in regional peace and security. Additionally, it is
evidence of the erosion of the OAU principle of absolute sovereignty
in favor of a more collective security arrangement in Africa under the
AU.
The AU also seems to be making progress, albeit slowly, on
bringing the major players in Darfur to the table to create a lasting
peace agreement. It has made good use of the strength in diplomacy
of its predecessor by appointing the former OAU Secretary-General to
coordinate the peace talks. Whether the talks will be fruitful remains
to be seen and will ultimately depend on the parties, but the
willingness of the parties to sit down together to talk is itself a
diplomatic success for the AU.
The inclusion in AMIS' mandate of protection of civilians reflects
a shift in thinking in terms of involvement in internal conflict. The
statement of the PSC indicates that AMIS will take on more than a
passive observer role, and may begin to engage in an active
peacekeeping function. 247 So far, however, the AU's involvement in
Darfur seems to straddle the line between observation and
peacekeeping. To be sure, the increase in the number of AU troops on
the ground in Darfur has been positively correlated with a significant
overall decrease in the number of civilian deaths. 248 Humanitarian
aid workers on the grounds in Darfur have noted that AU troops have
been somewhat effective at providing security for displaced civilians
where those troops are located (for example, at refugee camps). 249
The number of AU troops currently on the ground in Darfur, however,
is insufficient to cover the entire region. 250 More importantly, the AU
mandate allows only for the armed defense of civilians if those
civilians are attacked while in the immediate vicinity of AU troops. 251
The mandate does not allow the troops to proactively seek
engagement to protect or defend civilians in Darfur. 252 In fact, one
humanitarian aid worker noted that AU troops did not even send a
reaction force after their own troops were attacked and forced into
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retreat by the Janjaweed, because they did not believe their mandate
allowed it. 2 53 Many parties, including some AU troops in Darfur, are
clamoring for an expanded mandate that would allow AMIS to take
2 54
on a true peacekeeping role.
The Sudanese government has also not made good on its promise
255
the Janjaweed, as was recently declared by the AU.
disarm
to
Militia attacks on villages continue, and it is believed that these
attacks are still being actively assisted by the Sudanese
government. 256 Agreements made in the past by the Sudanese to
restrain these militias and to cease hostilities are not being honored,
and this frustrates the success of the mission of AMIS. The SLM/A
and JEM rebel movements are also proving to be difficult partners in
peace. The SLM/A is being blamed by the AU for the first killing of
AU troops in Darfur, when two Nigerian soldiers that were part of
AMIS were shot dead in early October 2005.257 The JEM also took
eighteen people hostage, including AU military observers and civilian
258
police, the following day.
The willingness of the AU to utilize its enforcement mechanisms
to compel Member States to respect its decisions remains to be seen
with regard to the situation in Sudan. Certainly, the institutional
capability to punish Member States who fail to abide by AU decisions
or fail to live up to their obligations to the AU is an improvement over
the complete lack of such a capability in the OAU. Economic
sanctions imposed by the AU on a recalcitrant state would be likely to
gain some level of compliance, even if diplomatic sanctions failed. In
the end, however, an institutional capability is only useful if it is
used.
In late 2004, Sudan ignored a deadline set by AU mediators to
cease hostilities. 259 Prior to the violation, the AU had threatened to
"refer [both] Sudan and the rebels to the U.N. Security Council if
[they] failed to meet the deadline. '2 60 This threat is misguided; for
the sake of institutional credibility, the AU must undertake to
sanction their Members directly for violations of an AU decisions.
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Only in this way will Member States come to understand that there
will be direct repercussions for failure to abide by AU decisions.
The AU demonstrated its willingness to impose sanctions upon
Member States when it suspended Togo from all AU activities on
February 25, 2005, for allowing for an unconstitutional transfer of
power to a new president in early February (he was installed as
president by the military).26 1 Notably, the President of Togo stepped
down from power on the same day, citing the best interests of his
country. 262 Thus, it appears that the AU is willing to use some of its
enforcement powers, and that these powers may have a tangible
effect.
The lack of funding that so hampered the effectiveness of the
OAU has not had a major practical impact on AMIS to date. While
there is a budget shortfall for the mission, and Member States and
other nations are being asked to contribute more to the AU, the AU
has been very effective at getting donations from rich western
countries. 263 Whether or not such donations continue for the entire
course of AMIS' deployment may have a significant impact on the
mission. It is clear that in the long run, the effectiveness of the AU
will be closely tied to its ability to develop a reasonable method of
determining the required amounts of member state contributions and
to enforce their collection. Perhaps tying contribution levels to a
percentage of the GDP of Member States would be a workable
formula.
The power structure of the AU does appear to be more balanced
than that of the OAU. While the Assembly, comprised in the OAU
and the AU of all of the heads of African states, is still the "supreme
organ," the creation of a PSC authorized to deal with many issues of
peace and security is a step forward from the OAU. The fact that the
Commission plays an active role in the functioning of the PSC is also
encouraging, and indicates that the Commission has more power than
did the OAU Secretary-General. The cooperation and collaboration
between the Assembly and the PSC is evident in the level of
agreement and relatively quick decision-making undertaken with
regard to the situation in Darfur.
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TV. CONCLUSION

The AU faces an important moment in its history. The successes
and failures of the OAU were recognized by the founders of the AU,
and many institutional changes were made to overcome the OAU's
limitations. The AU, as envisioned, is a new institution with the
capabilities to deal with twenty-first century African problems. Now
is the time to put theory to practice and to put muscle behind idea.
Only in the execution can the AU become a truly effective
organization. No longer can the U.N. or the world's major powers be
counted on to give necessary assistance to African countries in need.
The developed world may ignore African conflicts because it can, but
as the AU Ambassador to Burundi said during the AU's first
peacekeeping mission ever, "We are Africa, so we cannot let it go on
like that .... We know that the situation is very difficult, volatile.
'264
But we have to try.
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